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reinforced by reserves’ interaction with the maturity structure of external debt. The longer the 
average maturity of external debt, the stronger the marginal effect of international reserves. 
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1. Introduction 
The literature motivating central banks’ holdings of international reserves has 
identified a number of channels through which reserves contribute to financial stability: They 
reduce the probability of financial crises, moderate output losses and smooth consumption 
amid financial crises.
1
 The global financial crisis of 2008 has reaffirmed the importance of 
reserve holdings. By way of example, Ostry et al. (2012) document that emerging market 
countries with adequate reserve holdings ahead of the crisis generally suffered smaller output 
and consumption declines. However, reserve holdings are associated with substantial social 
costs because the domestic return on capital usually exceeds the yield of reserves (Rodrik, 
2006). 
In the recent past many emerging market and developing countries have piled up 
international reserves at unprecedented pace and probably to excess levels. The marginal 
effect of international reserves on financial stability diminishes as reserve holdings increase 
(IMF, 2011). At the same time, the social costs associated with reserves increase. Therefore, 
it may be questioned whether the accumulation of reserves to safeguard financial stability is 
still optimal in terms of costs and benefits.  
In fact, as a substitute for reserves, better economic fundamentals contribute to 
financial stability. For example, low and relatively stable inflation, an exchange rate near 
equilibrium, a reasonable level and composition of foreign liabilities (e.g. FDI versus hot 
money inflows), a sound maturity structure of external debt (e.g. long-term versus short-term 
debt) are all economic fundamentals that help to reduce the probability of financial crises 
(see, among others, Frankel and Saravelos, 2012).  
While it is clear that both reserves and sound economic fundamentals individually 
enhance financial stability, holding international reserves may enhance some fundamentals 
and thereby indirectly contribute to financial stability. Indeed, the literature highlights several 
positive effects of international reserves on economic fundamentals. For example, Cheung 
and Qian (2009) show that international reserves serve as an indicator for financial health, 
thus facilitating foreign capital inflows. Qian and Steiner (2014) go further to argue that 
reserves reduce the risk premium of foreign equity investment (PEI), thereby tilting the 
composition of foreign capital inflows towards relatively more PEI and less FDI. Finally, 
Qian and Steiner (2017) find that international reserves lengthen the average maturity of 
                                                 
1
 See for example Aizenman and Marion (2004), Aizenman and Lee (2007), and Steiner (2014). 
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external debt in emerging and developing countries and thereby contribute to financial 
stability.    
Against this backdrop we postulate that the degree to which international reserves 
influence a country’s financial stability is endogenously determined by international reserves, 
economic fundamentals, and their interactions. We interpret this interaction mechanism as the 
reinforcement effect of international reserves for financial stability, an effect that has not yet 
been identified by the literature. 
Utilizing a regression specification featuring international reserves, debt maturity and 
their interaction, we find that, apart from the positive individual effects of reserves and long-
term external debt on financial stability, they reinforce each other in enhancing financial 
stability of emerging markets and developing countries. The effect of international reserves 
on financial stability is the stronger, the longer the average maturity of external debt is. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section describes the empirical approach.  
Section 3 is devoted to the empirical analyses. Policy implications are discussed in the 
concluding section.  
 
2. Empirical approach and data 
We use macroeconomic data to empirically test the hypothesis that international 
reserves and the maturity structure of external debt reinforce each other in their contribution 
to financial stability.  To do so, we set up a standard regression specification with a measure 
of financial stability being the dependent variable (FinStab) and explanatory variables 
including international reserves (IR), the external debt maturity structure measured by the 
ratio of long-term over short-term debt (LT/ST), their interaction term (IR*LT/ST) that proxies 
the reinforcement effect and other control variables. In particular, our empirical model is a 
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  The Hausman test rejects a random effects specification.  
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where X is a set of control variables, ci a country fixed effect and ε the error term.
3
 All 
variables except financial account openness are expressed in logarithms such that coefficients 
denote elasticities. Our data set covers 107 emerging and developing countries over the 
period 1984 - 2014. A list of countries may be found in Appendix I. Appendix II lists the 
variable definitions and their sources. Summary statistics are provided in Appendix III. 
Financial stability is an enormously broad concept that is linked to many aspects of a 
country, e.g. the real economy, the financial system, its political and institutional quality, 
interactions between the real and financial economy, as well as interactions with other 
countries. This makes it very difficult to numerically measure financial stability with a single 
aggregate index. To rein this issue, many papers including financial stability reports from the 
IMF and numerous central bank publications either examine the stability of a country’s 
financial institutions (e.g. deposit takers, other financial corporations, real estate market) or 
focus on sectors of an economy - the real sector, the corporate sector, the household sector, 
the external sector, the financial sector, and the financial market - to assess systemic 
vulnerability and financial stability.
4
 Since international reserves are primarily related to 
external stability, we focus on assessing financial stability of the external sector. The 
financial risk index (FRI) extracted from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is 
used to measure external vulnerability. FRI is compiled from the following risk components: 
foreign debt as a percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of goods 
and services (XGS), current account as a percentage of XGS, net liquidity as months of import 
cover, and exchange rate stability.  
   Although being relatively comprehensive, the FRI index is a synthetic measure 
compiled from potentially endogenous factors such as the level of external debt. As a 
robustness check, we employ an alternative measure for financial stability, the EMBI+ 
spread, which is calculated as the EMBI+ premium over a U.S. government bond with 
comparable features.
5
 The EMBI+ spread gauges the risk level of a country’s sovereign debt, 
which in turn reflects the degree of financial stability – a high EMBI+ spread indicates a 
lower level of financial stability. EMBI+ data are available for a shorter time period from 
1993 to 2014 and a smaller number of countries (maximum of 48 countries) only. 
Our explanatory variables of main interest are international reserves, the maturity 
structure of external debt, and their interaction term. Drawing on the literature we 
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 A time trend is also included in the regression. 
4
 See IMF (2006) and a comprehensive survey provided by Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009). 
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 The Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) tracks total returns for traded debt instruments in emerging 
markets that are denominated in foreign currency and of fixed income. 
  5 
sequentially add further control variables. Financial stability might be affected by external 
factors – the world interest rate, trade openness and financial account openness – and 
domestic macroeconomic risk factors, proxied by changes of inflation, the government 
deficit, and political risk.  Finally, we control for financial crises (Mexico 1994, East Asia 
1997, and the 2008 global financial crisis) and the risk of a bank run or internal drain, 
measured by M2/GDP.  
 
3. Results 
There are two main findings that can be derived from the bare-bone specifications 
presented in Table 1 (Columns 1-3): First, as expected, both international reserves and a 
higher share of LT debt promote financial stability. Second, there is a strong reinforcement 
effect – the interaction of international reserves and the debt maturity structure increases the 
positive impact on financial stability by about 30%, other things equal.   
Next, we sequentially add further control variables to the regression. The presence of 
a reinforcement effect is confirmed after adding external factors and domestic factors in 
Columns 4 and 5, respectively. In fact, the reinforcement effect is estimated to be stronger 
(the coefficient increases from 0.014 to 0.021), although international reserves become 
insignificant. This shows that reserves’ effect on financial stability primarily works 
indirectly, namely through their positive impact on fundamentals, and less directly through 
their mere availability (signalling effect). The model that controls for financial crises 
(Column 6) yields similar results as those of previous regressions. When we include all 
groups of control variables in the regression in Column 7, the reinforcement effect of 
international reserves on financial stability is once again confirmed. Most of the control 
variables are significant and their signs as expected. For example, lower inflation and better 
political and institutional quality are positively associated with financial stability, whereas 
financial crises deteriorate financial stability. The last specification explains 49% of the 
variation in financial stability.   
Next, we re-run the regressions of Table 1 but with the EMBI+ spread as alternative 
dependent variable.
6
 As shown in Table 2, the results are comparable to those of Table 1.
7
 
For example, according to our estimate, a 1% increase in international reserves lowers the 
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 These regressions do not include the dummy variable for the Mexican crisis because of  the shorter time 
period. 
7
 Because of the definitions of the dependent variables, the signs of the coefficients change. While an increase in 
the financial risk index, the dependent variable in Table 1, implies lower financial instability, an increase in the 
EMBI+ spread (Table 2) denotes higher instabilities.  
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sovereign spread in developing countries by 0.39%. This suggests that a country with a 
higher level of reserves is financially more stable; similar results are obtained for the maturity 
structure of external debt. The reinforcement effect is stronger across all regressions using 
EMBI+ as dependent variable. Yields in financial markets seem to be more sensitive to 
reserve levels than the macroeconomic indicators that form the financial risk index. 
Nonetheless, both result tables point in the same direction: International reserves interact with 
the maturity structure of external debt and reinforce their effect on financial stability. Overall, 
the identified reinforcement effect is robust regardless of the measurement of financial 
stability and the specific set of control variables.                             
                      
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper examines how international reserves and the maturity structure of external 
debt interact and reinforce financial stability in emerging and developing countries. Due to 
this reinforcement effect reserves holdings entail a double dividend, which has been 
disregarded in the international finance literature so far. First, international reserves directly 
contribute to financial stability. Second, in the interplay with macroeconomic fundamentals 
they unfold an additional positive marginal effect. 
It is important to note that the identified benefits of reserves do not stem from their 
active use, but just from holding them: While the traditional literature argues that reserves 
may be sold in times of crises to stabilize the domestic financial system, our effects stem 
from the presence of a large lifejacket of reserves. 
Our findings also have significant policy implications. Due to the reinforcement 
effect, a given level of financial stability might be achieved with less reserves. Central banks 
may reconsider the adequacy of their reserve holdings. On the downside, if a low average 
maturity of external debt goes hand in hand with falling reserves, this increases the 
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Appendix I: Country sample list  
 
Country list for Table 1:  
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belarus, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Dem. 
Rep., Congo Rep., Croatia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
Country list for Table 2:  
Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea Rep., Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam. 
 
 
Appendix II: Variable definitions and sources 
 
FRI  Financial risk index (ICRG) measures the external vulnerability of a 
country. The following factors are assessed: Foreign debt as a 
percentage of GDP, foreign debt service as a percentage of exports of 
goods and services (XGS), current account as a percentage of XGS, net 
liquidity as months of import cover, and exchange rate stability. Risk 
ratings range from a high of 50 (least risk) to a low of 0 (highest risk).  
EMBI+ spread Secondary market spreads are calculated as the JP Morgan EMBI+ 
premium over a U.S. government bond with comparable features. 
EMBI+ captures total returns for traded external debt instruments (US 
dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans and Eurobonds) in emerging 
markets. Data source: World Bank Global Economic Monitor (GEM). 
LT/ST debt Ratio of long-term over short-term external debt. Short-term debt is 
defined as debt that has an original maturity of one year or less. Long-
term debt has an original or extended maturity of more than one year. 
Data source: World Bank International Debt Statistics. 
Int. reserves  Total reserves minus gold over GDP in current US dollar. Data source: 
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).    
M2/GDP  Risk of bank run and internal drain measured by money and quasi 
money (M2) as % of GDP. Data source: World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI). 
  9 
Real openness  Trade openness measured by imports and exports of goods and services 
as % of GDP. Data source: World Bank World Development Indicators 
(WDI). 
Financial openness  Chinn-Ito index of de jure capital controls. A higher value indicates a 
more open financial account. Source: Chinn and Ito (2006). 
Inflation Changes in the inflation rate measured by the logarithm of current 
inflation over previous year’s inflation. Data source: World Bank 
World Development Indicators (WDI).  
Govern. deficit Government deficit measured by the logarithm of government spending 
to government revenue. Data source: World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
Political risk Overall political risk index that covers 12 risk components from ICRG. 
Smaller values indicate higher levels of risk.  
World interest rate Change in the 3-month US Treasury bill rate.  
Mexican crisis Mexican crisis of 1994, dummy variable, I(t>=1994 and t<1997) = 1.  
Asian crisis  Asian financial crisis of 1997, dummy variable, I(t>=1997 and t<2008) 
= 1. 
Global fin. crisis  Global financial crisis beginning in 2008, dummy variable, I(t>=2008) 
= 1. 
Trend   Time trend  
  10 
Appendix III: Summary statistics of variables  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fin. risk index 3390 3.465181 0.3161196 1.386294 3.912023 
EMBI+ spread 708 5.843748 0.8254484 2.780026 8.661092 
Int. reserves 4835 -2.351437 1.150858 -9.341909 1.105303 
LT/ST debt 3948 2.449126 1.691523 -2.083873 16.37172 
Govern. deficit 2378 -0.3601051 0.5730245 -2.6181 4.044331 
Inflation 4191 -0.0604691 0.9334667 -7.607177 6.982428 
Financial openness 4985 -0.2261708 1.433688 -1.843764 2.477618 
Real openness 5168 4.281402 0.6434815 -3.863269 6.27615 
World interest rate 7104 0.6893717 1.774857 -3.426515 2.640841 
M2/GDP 4787 3.620062 0.7270214 -1.319245 9.817226 
Political risk 3272 0.0058778 0.0850239 -0.9520088 0.9382696 
  11 
Table 1: Determinants of financial stability – Financial risk index (ICRG), 1984-2014 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) 
Int. reserves 0.064***  0.030** 0.009 0.021 0.026* 0.007 
  (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
LT/ST debt  0.011 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.049** 0.033*** 0.038**  
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Int. reserves* LT/ST debt   0.014*** 0.016*** 0.021* 0.014*** 0.017**  
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
World interest rate    0.003   0.002 
     (0.01)   (0.01) 
Real openness    0.115**   -0.062 
     (0.05)   (0.05) 
Financial openness    0.035***   0.026*   
     (0.01)   (0.01) 
Inflation     -0.006**  -0.009**  
      (0.00)  (0.00) 
Govern. deficit     -0.048  -0.086**  
      (0.04)  (0.04) 
Political risk     0.306***  0.285*** 
     (0.07)  (0.07) 
M2/GDP      -0.031 -0.028 
         (0.02) (0.05) 
Mexican crisis      0.057*** -0.007 
       (0.02) (0.03) 
Asian crisis      -0.000 -0.146**  
       (0.04) (0.06) 
Global fin. crisis      -0.083 -0.254*** 
       (0.06) (0.07) 
Trend 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.031*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -57.923*** -89.809*** -68.844*** -71.358*** -59.053*** -89.037*** -137.368*** 
  -4.757 -5.13 -5.029 -7.175 -8.569 -11.739 -19.143 
         
R-squared 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.42 0.53 0.49 
# of observations 3099 2521 2322 1779 1076 2294 830 
# of groups 107 82 80 79 67 80 64 
Notes: Fixed effect panel data regressions. All variables - except the crisis dummies and financial openness - are in logarithms and lagged by one period. Robust errors are in 
parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2: Determinants of financial stability – EMBI+ spread, 1993-2014 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) 
Int. reserves -0.391***  -0.311** -0.222* -0.410** -0.402*** -0.191*   
  (0.11)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.10) 
LT/ST debt  -0.043 -0.199*** -0.314*** -0.242*** -0.122 -0.245*** 
   (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) 
Int. reserves* LT/ST debt   -0.062* -0.145*** -0.092** -0.026 -0.126*** 
       (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
World interest rate    0.004   0.047 
     (0.03)   (0.03) 
Real openness    0.179   0.534 
     (0.26)   (0.44) 
Financial openness    -0.087   -0.150 
     (0.06)   (0.11) 
Inflation     0.000  -0.011 
      (0.03)  (0.03) 
Govern. deficit     0.178  0.134 
      (0.28)  (0.24) 
Political risk     -1.043**  -0.775*   
     (0.50)  (0.41) 
M2/GDP      -0.264 0.047 
         (0.26) (0.28) 
Asian crisis      0.578*** 0.836*** 
       (0.12) (0.16) 
Global fin. crisis      1.436*** 2.159*** 
       (0.19) (0.23) 
Trend -0.020** -0.030*** -0.024*** -0.034** -0.022* -0.085*** -0.163*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant 97.263** 144.057*** 117.127*** 165.238** 114.257* 391.555*** 854.808*** 
  (39.31) (41.17) (38.20) (63.18) (56.27) (59.90) (101.22) 
         
R-squared 0.15 0.08 0.22 0.27 0.31 0.37 0.64 
# of observations 703 570 565 365 358 558 244 
# of groups 48 39 39 37 33 39 30 
Notes: Fixed effect panel data regressions. All variables - except the crisis dummies and financial openness - are in logarithms and lagged by one period. Robust errors are in 











List of research reports 
 
 
12001-HRM&OB: Veltrop, D.B., C.L.M. Hermes, T.J.B.M. Postma and J. de Haan, A Tale 
of Two Factions: Exploring the Relationship between Factional Faultlines and Conflict 
Management in Pension Fund Boards 
 
12002-EEF: Angelini, V. and J.O. Mierau, Social and Economic Aspects of Childhood 
Health: Evidence from Western-Europe 
 
12003-Other: Valkenhoef, G.H.M. van, T. Tervonen, E.O. de Brock and H. Hillege, Clinical 
trials information in drug development and regulation: existing systems and standards 
 
12004-EEF: Toolsema, L.A. and M.A. Allers, Welfare financing: Grant allocation and 
efficiency 
 
12005-EEF: Boonman, T.M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and G.H. Kuper, The Global Financial Crisis 
and currency crises in Latin America 
 
12006-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and E. Sterken, Participation and Performance at the London 
2012 Olympics 
 
12007-Other: Zhao, J., G.H.M. van Valkenhoef, E.O. de Brock and H. Hillege, ADDIS: an 
automated way to do network meta-analysis 
 
12008-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Individualism and the cultural roots of management 
practices 
 
12009-EEF: Dungey, M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs, J. Tian and S. van Norden, On trend-cycle 
decomposition and data revision 
 
12010-EEF: Jong-A-Pin, R., J-E. Sturm and J. de Haan, Using real-time data to test for 
political budget cycles 
 
12011-EEF: Samarina, A., Monetary targeting and financial system characteristics: An 
empirical analysis 
 
12012-EEF: Alessie, R., V. Angelini and P. van Santen, Pension wealth and household 
savings in Europe: Evidence from SHARELIFE 
 
13001-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and M. Mulder, Cross-border infrastructure constraints, 
regulatory measures and economic integration of the Dutch – German gas market 
 
13002-EEF: Klein Goldewijk, G.M. and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, The relation between stature and 
long bone length in the Roman Empire 
 
13003-EEF: Mulder, M. and L. Schoonbeek, Decomposing changes in competition in the 
Dutch electricity market through the Residual Supply Index 
 
13004-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and M. Mulder, Cross-border constraints, institutional changes 











13005-EEF: Wiese, R., Do political or economic factors drive healthcare financing 
privatisations? Empirical evidence from OECD countries 
 
13006-EEF: Elhorst, J.P., P. Heijnen, A. Samarina and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, State transfers at 
different moments in time: A spatial probit approach 
 
13007-EEF: Mierau, J.O., The activity and lethality of militant groups: Ideology, capacity, 
and environment 
 
13008-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan and M. Mulder, The effect of industry structure and 
yardstick design on strategic behavior with yardstick competition: an experimental study 
 
13009-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Values of financial services professionals and the global 
financial crisis as a crisis of ethics 
 
13010-EEF: Boonman, T.M., Sovereign defaults, business cycles and economic growth in 
Latin America, 1870-2012 
 
13011-EEF: He, X., J.P.A.M Jacobs, G.H. Kuper and J.E. Ligthart, On the impact of the 
global financial crisis on the euro area 
 
13012-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Generational shifts in managerial values and the coming 
of a global business culture 
 
13013-EEF: Samarina, A. and J.E. Sturm, Factors leading to inflation targeting – The 
impact of adoption 
 
13014-EEF: Allers, M.A. and E. Merkus, Soft budget constraint but no moral hazard? The 
Dutch local government bailout puzzle 
 
13015-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Trust and management: Explaining cross-national 
differences in work autonomy 
 
13016-EEF: Boonman, T.M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and G.H. Kuper, Sovereign debt crises in 
Latin America: A market pressure approach 
 
13017-GEM: Oosterhaven, J., M.C. Bouwmeester and M. Nozaki, The impact of 
production and infrastructure shocks: A non-linear input-output programming approach, 
tested on an hypothetical economy 
 
13018-EEF: Cavapozzi, D., W. Han and R. Miniaci, Alternative weighting structures for 
multidimensional poverty assessment 
 
14001-OPERA: Germs, R. and N.D. van Foreest, Optimal control of production-inventory 
systems with constant and compound poisson demand 
 
14002-EEF: Bao, T. and J. Duffy, Adaptive vs. eductive learning: Theory and evidence 
 
14003-OPERA: Syntetos, A.A. and R.H. Teunter, On the calculation of safety stocks 
 
14004-EEF: Bouwmeester, M.C., J. Oosterhaven and J.M. Rueda-Cantuche, Measuring 
the EU value added embodied in EU foreign exports by consolidating 27 national supply 











14005-OPERA: Prak, D.R.J., R.H. Teunter and J. Riezebos, Periodic review and 
continuous ordering 
 
14006-EEF: Reijnders, L.S.M., The college gender gap reversal: Insights from a life-cycle 
perspective 
 
14007-EEF: Reijnders, L.S.M., Child care subsidies with endogenous education and 
fertility 
 
14008-EEF: Otter, P.W., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and A.H.J. den Reijer, A criterion for the number 
of factors in a data-rich environment 
 
14009-EEF: Mierau, J.O. and E. Suari Andreu, Fiscal rules and government size in the 
European Union 
 
14010-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan and M. Mulder, Industry structure and collusion 
with uniform yardstick competition: theory and experiments 
 
14011-EEF: Huizingh, E. and M. Mulder, Effectiveness of regulatory interventions on firm 
behavior: a randomized field experiment with e-commerce firms 
 
14012-GEM: Bressand, A., Proving the old spell wrong: New African hydrocarbon 
producers and the ‘resource curse’ 
 
14013-EEF: Dijkstra P.T., Price leadership and unequal market sharing: Collusion in 
experimental markets 
 
14014-EEF: Angelini, V., M. Bertoni, and L. Corazzini, Unpacking the determinants of life 
satisfaction: A survey experiment 
 
14015-EEF: Heijdra, B.J., J.O. Mierau, and T. Trimborn, Stimulating annuity markets 
 
14016-GEM: Bezemer, D., M. Grydaki, and L. Zhang, Is financial development bad for 
growth? 
 
14017-EEF: De Cao, E. and C. Lutz, Sensitive survey questions: measuring attitudes 
regarding female circumcision through a list experiment 
 
14018-EEF: De Cao, E., The height production function from birth to maturity 
 
14019-EEF: Allers, M.A. and J.B. Geertsema, The effects of local government 
amalgamation on public spending and service levels. Evidence from 15 years of municipal 
boundary reform 
 
14020-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and J.H. Veurink, Central bank independence and political 
pressure in the Greenspan era 
 
14021-GEM: Samarina, A. and D. Bezemer, Do Capital Flows Change Domestic Credit 
Allocation? 
 
14022-EEF: Soetevent, A.R. and L. Zhou, Loss Modification Incentives for Insurers Under 










14023-EEF: Allers, M.A. and W. Vermeulen, Fiscal Equalization, Capitalization and the 
Flypaper Effect. 
 
14024-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Trust, Workplace Organization, and Comparative 
Economic Development. 
 
14025-GEM: Bezemer, D., and L. Zhang, From Boom to Bust in de Credit Cycle: The Role 
of Mortgage Credit. 
 
14026-GEM: Zhang, L., and D. Bezemer, How the Credit Cycle Affects Growth: The Role 
of Bank Balance Sheets. 
 
14027-EEF: Bružikas, T., and A.R. Soetevent, Detailed Data and Changes in Market 
Structure: The Move to Unmanned Gasoline Service Stations. 
 
14028-EEF: Bouwmeester, M.C., and B. Scholtens, Cross-border Spillovers from 
European Gas Infrastructure Investments. 
 
14029-EEF: Lestano, and G.H. Kuper, Correlation Dynamics in East Asian Financial 
Markets. 
 
14030-GEM: Bezemer, D.J., and M. Grydaki, Nonfinancial Sectors Debt and the U.S. 
Great Moderation. 
 
14031-EEF: Hermes, N., and R. Lensink, Financial Liberalization and Capital Flight: 
Evidence from the African Continent. 
 
14032-OPERA: Blok, C. de, A. Seepma, I. Roukema, D.P. van Donk, B. Keulen, and R. 
Otte, Digitalisering in Strafrechtketens: Ervaringen in Denemarken, Engeland, Oostenrijk 
en Estland vanuit een Supply Chain Perspectief. 
 
14033-OPERA: Olde Keizer, M.C.A., and R.H. Teunter, Opportunistic condition-based 
maintenance and aperiodic inspections for a two-unit series system. 
 
14034-EEF: Kuper, G.H., G. Sierksma, and F.C.R. Spieksma, Using Tennis Rankings to 
Predict Performance in Upcoming Tournaments 
 
15001-EEF: Bao, T., X. Tian, X. Yu, Dictator Game with Indivisibility of Money 
 
15002-GEM: Chen, Q., E. Dietzenbacher, and B. Los, The Effects of Ageing and 
Urbanization on China’s Future Population and Labor Force 
 
15003-EEF: Allers, M., B. van Ommeren, and B. Geertsema, Does intermunicipal 
cooperation create inefficiency? A comparison of interest rates paid by intermunicipal 
organizations, amalgamated municipalities and not recently amalgamated municipalities 
 
15004-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan, and M. Mulder, Design of Yardstick Competition 
and Consumer Prices: Experimental Evidence 
 












15006-EEF: Anufriev, M., T. Bao, A. Sutin, and J. Tuinstra, Fee Structure, Return Chasing 
and Mutual Fund Choice: An Experiment 
 
15007-EEF: Lamers, M., Depositor Discipline and Bank Failures in Local Markets During 
the Financial Crisis 
 
15008-EEF: Oosterhaven, J., On de Doubtful Usability of the Inoperability IO Model 
 
15009-GEM: Zhang, L. and D. Bezemer, A Global House of Debt Effect? Mortgages and 
Post-Crisis Recessions in Fifty Economies 
 
15010-I&O: Hooghiemstra, R., N. Hermes, L. Oxelheim, and T. Randøy, The Impact of 
Board Internationalization on Earnings Management 
 
15011-EEF: Haan, M.A., and W.H. Siekman, Winning Back the Unfaithful while Exploiting 
the Loyal: Retention Offers and Heterogeneous Switching Costs 
 
15012-EEF: Haan, M.A., J.L. Moraga-González, and V. Petrikaite, Price and Match-Value 
Advertising with Directed Consumer Search 
 
15013-EEF: Wiese, R., and S. Eriksen, Do Healthcare Financing Privatisations Curb Total 
Healthcare Expenditures? Evidence from OECD Countries 
 
15014-EEF: Siekman, W.H., Directed Consumer Search 
 
15015-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Organizational Culture in the Financial Sector: Evidence 
from a Cross-Industry Analysis of Employee Personal Values and Career Success 
 
15016-EEF: Te Bao, and C. Hommes, When Speculators Meet Constructors: Positive and 
Negative Feedback in Experimental Housing Markets 
 
15017-EEF: Te Bao, and Xiaohua Yu, Memory and Discounting: Theory and Evidence 
 
15018-EEF: Suari-Andreu, E., The Effect of House Price Changes on Household Saving 
Behaviour: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of the Dutch Case 
 
15019-EEF: Bijlsma, M., J. Boone, and G. Zwart, Community Rating in Health Insurance: 
Trade-off between Coverage and Selection 
 
15020-EEF: Mulder, M., and B. Scholtens, A Plant-level Analysis of the Spill-over Effects 
of the German Energiewende 
 
15021-GEM: Samarina, A., L. Zhang, and D. Bezemer, Mortgages and Credit Cycle 
Divergence in Eurozone Economies 
 
16001-GEM: Hoorn, A. van, How Are Migrant Employees Manages? An Integrated 
Analysis 
 
16002-EEF: Soetevent, A.R., Te Bao, A.L. Schippers, A Commercial Gift for Charity 
 












16004-MARK: Holtrop, N., J.E. Wieringa, M.J. Gijsenberg, and P. Stern, Competitive 
Reactions to Personal Selling: The Difference between Strategic and Tactical Actions 
 
16005-EEF: Plantinga, A. and B. Scholtens, The Financial Impact of Divestment from 
Fossil Fuels 
 
16006-GEM: Hoorn, A. van, Trust and Signals in Workplace Organization: Evidence from 
Job Autonomy Differentials between Immigrant Groups 
 
16007-EEF: Willems, B. and G. Zwart, Regulatory Holidays and Optimal Network 
Expansion 
 
16008-GEF: Hoorn, A. van, Reliability and Validity of the Happiness Approach to 
Measuring Preferences 
 
16009-EEF: Hinloopen, J., and A.R. Soetevent, (Non-)Insurance Markets, Loss Size 
Manipulation and Competition: Experimental Evidence 
 
16010-EEF: Bekker, P.A., A Generalized Dynamic Arbitrage Free Yield Model 
 
16011-EEF: Mierau, J.A., and M. Mink, A Descriptive Model of Banking and Aggregate 
Demand 
 
16012-EEF: Mulder, M. and B. Willems, Competition in Retail Electricity Markets: An 
Assessment of Ten Year Dutch Experience 
 
16013-GEM: Rozite, K., D.J. Bezemer, and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, Towards a Financial Cycle for 
the US, 1873-2014 
 
16014-EEF: Neuteleers, S., M. Mulder, and F. Hindriks, Assessing Fairness of Dynamic 
Grid Tariffs 
 
16015-EEF: Soetevent, A.R., and T. Bružikas, Risk and Loss Aversion, Price Uncertainty 
and the Implications for Consumer Search 
 
16016-HRM&OB: Meer, P.H. van der, and R. Wielers, Happiness, Unemployment and 
Self-esteem 
 
16017-EEF: Mulder, M., and M. Pangan, Influence of Environmental Policy and Market 
Forces on Coal-fired Power Plants: Evidence on the Dutch Market over 2006-2014 
 
16018-EEF: Zeng,Y., and M. Mulder, Exploring Interaction Effects of Climate Policies: A 
Model Analysis of the Power Market 
 
16019-EEF: Ma, Yiqun, Demand Response Potential of Electricity End-users Facing Real 
Time Pricing 
 
16020-GEM: Bezemer, D., and A. Samarina, Debt Shift, Financial Development and 
Income Inequality in Europe 
 
16021-EEF: Elkhuizen, L, N. Hermes, and J. Jacobs, Financial Development, Financial 











16022-GEM: Gerritse, M., Does Trade Cause Institutional Change? Evidence from 
Countries South of the Suez Canal 
 
16023-EEF: Rook, M., and M. Mulder, Implicit Premiums in Renewable-Energy Support 
Schemes 
 
17001-EEF: Trinks, A., B. Scholtens, M. Mulder, and L. Dam, Divesting Fossil Fuels: The 
Implications for Investment Portfolios 
 
17002-EEF: Angelini, V., and J.O. Mierau, Late-life Health Effects of Teenage Motherhood 
 
17003-EEF: Jong-A-Pin, R., M. Laméris, and H. Garretsen, Political Preferences of 
(Un)happy Voters: Evidence Based on New Ideological Measures 
 
17004-EEF: Jiang, X., N. Hermes, and A. Meesters, Financial Liberalization, the 
Institutional Environment and Bank Efficiency 
 
17005-EEF: Kwaak, C. van der, Financial Fragility and Unconventional Central Bank 
Lending Operations 
 
17006-EEF: Postelnicu, L. and N. Hermes, The Economic Value of Social Capital 
 
17007-EEF: Ommeren, B.J.F. van, M.A. Allers, and M.H. Vellekoop, Choosing the Optimal 
Moment to Arrange a Loan 
 
17008-EEF: Bekker, P.A., and K.E. Bouwman, A Unified Approach to Dynamic Mean-
Variance Analysis in Discrete and Continuous Time 
 
17009-EEF: Bekker, P.A., Interpretable Parsimonious Arbitrage-free Modeling of the Yield 
Curve 
 
17010-GEM: Schasfoort, J., A. Godin, D. Bezemer, A. Caiani, and S. Kinsella, Monetary 
Policy Transmission in a Macroeconomic Agent-Based Model 
 
17011-I&O: Bogt, H. ter, Accountability, Transparency and Control of Outsourced Public 
Sector Activities 
 
17012-GEM: Bezemer, D., A. Samarina, and L. Zhang, The Shift in Bank Credit 
Allocation: New Data and New Findings 
 
17013-EEF: Boer, W.I.J. de, R.H. Koning, and J.O. Mierau, Ex-ante and Ex-post 
Willingness-to-pay for Hosting a Major Cycling Event 
 
17014-OPERA: Laan, N. van der, W. Romeijnders, and M.H. van der Vlerk, Higher-order 
Total Variation Bounds for Expectations of Periodic Functions and Simple Integer 
Recourse Approximations 
 
17015-GEM: Oosterhaven, J., Key Sector Analysis: A Note on the Other Side of the Coin 
 
17016-EEF: Romensen, G.J., A.R. Soetevent: Tailored Feedback and Worker Green 











17017-EEF: Trinks, A., G. Ibikunle, M. Mulder, and B. Scholtens, Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Intensity and the Cost of Capital 
 
17018-GEM: Qian, X. and A. Steiner, The Reinforcement Effect of International Reserves 
for Financial Stability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
